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Introduction
A signifi cant body of research on happiness has emerged in recent years with scholars 
from diff erent social scientifi c disciplines starting to express an academic interest in this topic. 
Considered one of the few examples of successful interdisciplinary research (Frey – Stutzer 
2007), happiness studies have grown as a substantive fi eld since the second half of the 20th 
century1. With a burgeoning body of literature, it would be beyond the limitations imposed by 
this article to review all of the key themes, concerns and controversies that have emerged and 
developed. Th is paper aims to be located in the fi eld of existing sociological research, but also 
in the broader happiness literature, and thus it explores aspects of sociological and economical 
approaches to happiness research. 
Despite the relative young age of the fi eld of happiness studies, the last three decades have 
seen an exponential increase in the interest in happiness and wellbeing expressed by academics 
in diff erent social scientifi c disciplines. Th e majority of studies in the fi eld use the concept of 
happiness or subjective wellbeing as the objects of their inquiry, with an initial wave of academic 
literature focusing on correlates of happiness and social indicators. Happiness research shows a 
problematic divide between the two methodological approaches – qualitative and quantitative 
– which is not just in sociology, but also across the diff erent social sciences implicated in hap-
piness research. On the one hand, quantitative studies generally seek to measure happiness on a 
societal level across geography and across time periods – these can be transversal or longitudinal 
studies. On the other hand, qualitative studies include other variables, like culture, identity or 
emotions and seek to explore everyday experiences of happiness – this type of literature is scarce, 
but in recent years scholars have expressed an increasing interest in this type of exploration (see 
Hyman 2014 and Cieslik 2013). Th e lack of qualitative research is seen by some to be a good 
reason for sociologists to engage with and contribute to the fi eld of happiness studies (Bartram 
2011). Finally, there is one last characteristic that distinguishes the conceptual approaches in 
this article from the majority of studies on happiness, and that is questioning the rhetoric of 
‘the science of happiness’. Scholars across the social sciences seem to take the concept of ‘science’ 
for granted, without much room for debate as to whether happiness studies constitute a science 
or not. Th e University of California, Berkeley off ers a course titled ‘Th e Science of Happiness’ 
(starting September 2014), while MIT2 off ered a course titled ‘Th e Art and Science of Happiness’ 
(2013), so in this case it is presented as both science and art. Furthermore, a search on Google 
Scholar for ‘science of happiness’ returns a large number of scholarly articles and books with 
both ‘science’ and ‘happiness’ in the title, and even the papers that off er a critique of the fi eld 
or some critique of positive psychology3 still do not question whether happiness studies can 
indeed be categorised as a ‘science’. However, this article does not attempt to make the case for 
or against happiness studies as being a science, but rather open the subject to further debate. 
For the remainder of this article, I will fi rst look at how the discipline of sociology has 
engaged with happiness research so far and what some of the future directions could be; and 
 1 In 1948, the World Health Organization (WHO) published the Constitution of World Health Organization, 
where it defi ned health as a ‘a state of complete physical, mental, and social well being not merely the absence 
of disease or infi rmity’, and also proposed and developed ways of measuring and promoting the quality of 
life of people around the globe. (WHO 1948; Cieslik 2013). 
 2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 3 Miller 2008.
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second I will look into the discipline of happiness economics (or behavioural economics as it 
is sometimes referred to), as it is one of the social sciences that have engaged with happiness 
research in ways that move beyond the traditional concerns in economics (Cieslik 2013).
Happiness in Sociology
Turning a blind eye
Th e Oxford Handbook of Happiness (2014) edited by Susan David, Ilona Boniwell, and 
Amanda Conley Ayers, is a thick book of 1104 pages, described in the Oxford University Press 
catalogue as ‘[t]he most comprehensive handbook on happiness ever published, exploring psy-
chological, philosophical, evolutionary, economic, and spiritual approaches to happiness in a 
single volume’. Searching the volume for the words ‘sociology’ or ‘sociological’ would return 20 
results, almost all relating to names of university departments (e.g. School of Sociology and Social 
Policy), or to journal names in the bibliography section (e.g. American Journal of Sociology). It is, 
perhaps, at least peculiar that ‘[t]he most comprehensive handbook on happiness ever published’ 
does not include any sociological research, critique or outlook on happiness. Similarly, the six 
volume set Wellbeing: A Complete Reference Guide (Wiley-Blackwell 2014) edited by Cary Cooper 
has no mention of sociological angles on wellbeing, and Th e World Book of Happiness (2010) 
edited by Leo Bormans that comprises the work of 100 researchers from 50 countries, includes 
but two sociological contributions. 
Sociologists’ reluctance and scepticism about happiness research seem odd when considered 
in the context of long standing philosophical traditions in this area – from Eastern philosophers 
and Ancient Greek stoics to Enlightenment thinkers – and also in the context of more recent 
psychological contributions. Writers from these traditions discuss the wishes and desires that 
everybody appears to have: to be happy and to enjoy life. Th ere is perhaps ‘no other goal in life 
that commands such a high degree of consensus’ (Frey – Stutzer 2002. vi.). Moreover, early 
discussions about this apparent ubiquitous aspiration are presented in a larger context that, in 
fact, off ers ‘a sophisticated appreciation of the diff erent dimensions of wellbeing that illustrate 
the enigma of happiness’ (Cieslik 2013. 5.). Without extrapolating to all periods in human 
history (see Jugureanu et al. 2014. on the sociogenesis of the concept of happiness), happiness 
has been and is today, to some extent, a skill to be learned. Learning to live a good life and to 
be happy requires eff ort, time and dedication like any other prowess, as Aristotle attests in his 
Nicomachean Ethics, and the self-help industry today ‘sells’ happiness much within the same 
creed, that happiness is a practice, and a skill that can be learned. In this way, from Eastern 
philosophers and Greek stoics to modern day self-help gurus, life coaches, motivational speakers, 
and personal development professionals, what they all seem to have in common is the principle 
of teaching others about the skills necessary for a happy, balanced and fl ourishing life.
Despite its place in classic sociology (in the work of Weber, Durkheim, Marx, Simmel and 
Comte), the contemporary study of happiness remains both under-researched and under-repre-
sented in cross-disciplinary accounts. Although classic sociologists did not always clearly use 
the words ‘happiness’ or ‘subjective wellbeing’, their work oft en implied happiness in a certain 
context. Durkheim, for instance, looked at the relationship between anomie and social cohesion, 
and indicated that individuals should pursue happiness through a new moral order defi ned by 
community and by rituals (Durkheim 1961 [1912]); Comte, in his foundation of positivism 
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linked the intellectual and moral crisis with the pursuit of happiness (Plé 2000) and argued 
that people can only cultivate and attain their happiness in society (Castro 1997); Simmel held 
individualism to be the foundation for happiness (Glatzer 2000); Weber presented how life 
was defi ned by the protestant ethic and the extent to which individuals would make choices that 
would grant them divine redemption (Weber 2002 [1904]); and Marx deduced that capitalism, 
concomitantly with alienation would make people clearly unhappy (Marx and Engels 1988).
However, sociology’s scepticism towards approaching happiness as a domain of investi-
gation can be traced to the early works of Marx and Durkheim (Cieslik 2013). Both Marx and 
Durkheim have argued that modern societies fabricate new wishes and needs, while encouraging 
an individualistic lifestyle that oft en equates consumerism with the key to being happy. Few 
contemporary sociologists (Veenhoven 2008; Abbott – Wallace 2012; Cieslik 2013, Bar-
tram 2011) have attempted to root the dearth of sociological approaches to happiness research. 
Cieslik (2013), referring to traditions in classical sociology, particularly to Marx and Durkheim’s 
sociology, argues that ‘[t]hese analyses of the rise of individualism, the growth of egoistic concep-
tions of happiness and critiques of empiricist-reductionism theories established a powerful 
formula for many later sociological approaches to happiness.’ (Cieslik 2013. 5.). Veenhoven 
(2008), on the other hand, associates the absence of happiness research in sociology with three 
motives, which are pragmatic, ideological and theoretical. Th ey are pragmatic because sociolo-
gists are generally concerned with human behavior rather than with emotions, ideological due 
to the discipline’s preference for certain types of measurements (e.g. looking at social equality 
to measure objective wellbeing), and they are theoretical particularly due to how happiness is 
defi ned by sociologists, some consider it akin to a ‘whimsical state of mind’ (Veenhoven 2008. 
44.). Indeed, a lot depends on how the researcher defi nes the object of study, as Hyman (2011) 
observes; for sociologists, happiness appears to be an elusive emotion, a state or a process. Just 
like love, happiness is ‘knowable only intuitively, at the level of feeling’ (Jackson 1999. 100.), 
it is something that humans experience at the level of the nervous system, and that makes it a 
subject that ‘sits outside of the scope of sociological inquiry’ (Hyman 2011.106.).  
Furthermore, some sociologists (Marcuse 1964; Rieff 1966; Cohen – Taylor 1976; Lasch 
1979; Furedi 2004) question both the place and the attainability of happiness in contemporary 
societies. Much of the prevailing criticism addresses the individualistic emphasis placed on how 
one becomes happy, the kind of very simplistic ways of approaching happiness perpetuated by 
the self-help industry and mainstream media that overlooks socio-economics conditions, but 
zooms in on the individual. Oft en, the picture of the simple ideas that people have about hap-
piness and ways to achieve it is problematic for sociologists, as these ways are seen to corrode 
‘authentic political, and cultural ways of existence’ (Cieslik 2013. 4.). 
Continuing the appreciation of happiness studies as ‘self-help’, some sociologists are inclined 
towards critically engaging with more ‘negative’ topics, like alienation or vulnerability, and view 
the act of researching happiness as naïve, partly due to the impression that happiness studies 
are a ‘ground marked out by self-help writers’ (Bartram 2011. 18.). 
In recent sociology, Bauman (2008) in his book Th e art of life, associates happiness with 
good feeling and considers it to be central to his notion of liquid modernity, by virtue of under-
pinning the fl uid and dynamic cultures. Th e consumerist promise of a happy life leads people to 
search for an elusive fulfi lling way of life, as the commodifi ed understandings of happiness are 
not enough, therefore people seem to be ‘trapped in an endless search for a better life’ (Cieslik 
2013.4.). Similarly, Hochschild (2003) also sees happiness as problematic evoking some of the 
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same concerns that happiness has lost its deeper sense and meanings as a result of long-term 
processes of commodifi cation. 
Traditionally, sociology has been known to be the study of social problems, of the structure 
and functioning of human society, being generally concerned with issues pertaining to the 
sphere of the pathological. Happiness research stems from the discipline of psychology, partly as 
a backlash against the prominence of ‘negative’ concerns, but this kind of focus on dysfunction 
has also characterised sociology ‘where one fi nds a central role for concepts such as anomie, 
alienation, disenchantment, inequality and (more recently) vulnerability.’ (Bartram 2011. 15.). 
Furthermore, a study of happiness, wellbeing or human fl ourishing appears to not sit well with 
any particular sociological subfi eld (Hyman 2011). For example, at each British Sociological 
Association Annual Conference of the last four years, happiness papers have been placed in dif-
ferent streams in search for an ideal fi t, from Medicine, Health and Illness to Work, Employment 
and Economic Life. Arguably, happiness papers could fi t in all of the streams, depending on the 
argument and research outlook. 
Finally, scholars have also argued that happiness has actually always been a concern of 
societies and has been relevant to the study of society (Frawley 2012), however social scientists 
have only recently showed a renewed interest in happiness aft er a long period of being concerned 
with the negative. ‘Sociology’s blind eye’4 for happiness can thus be explained by sociologists’ 
long-held ‘preoccupation with misery’ (Veenhoven 2006. 4.), despite it having a bearing on 
‘19th century founding fathers of sociology’ (Veenhoven 2006. 3.).
How sociology can help
Despite, or perhaps because of ‘sociology’s blind eye for happiness’, there are now few resear-
chers who argue that the discipline of sociology has the necessary tools to correct the diffi  culty 
that happiness research is, as Reeves (2009. 24.) describes it, profoundly ‘over-researched and 
under-theorised’. Over the past twenty years, happiness research across the social sciences has 
produced a large array of empirical results, from measurements and causes to correlates and 
determinants, however the ways in which these empirical results can be integrated into broader 
theoretical narratives (within sociology and social sciences more general) remain uncertain. Th is 
situation has led some to conclude that subjective wellbeing ‘is oft en – and appropriately – viewed 
as an atheoretical research topic’ (George 2010.332.), while others suggest that sociology, by 
contrast, is an academic discipline rich in theories relevant for wellbeing (Kroll 2011.). Moreover, 
sociologists could contribute to happiness studies by also considering the social conditions, as 
opposed to just an individualist position (common approach in positive psychology), as well as 
the inadvertent outcomes of implementing happiness research at policy level (Bartram 2011). 
A number of studies refer to the increasing interest that scholars from diff erent social 
sciences, especially psychology and economics have shown towards happiness and wellbeing 
research. At the same time, many of them suggest the need for a sociological response to the 
current literature, which is saturated with individualistic conceptualisations of happiness and 
biological views. In a review of developments in the sociology of mental health and illness, 
Horwitz (2002) writes:
Psychologists have paid far more attention to positive states of mental health than sociolo-
gists [...]. Th ey oft en assert that the environment can only create short-term fl uctuations in 
 4 A phrase coined by Ruut Veenhoven (2006) 
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happiness, which is a stable individual or genetic trait [...]. It is time that sociologists met 
this challenge by examining the social determinants of positive states of well-being [...]. Hap-
piness, no less than distress, ought to respond to changes in the social structure and culture 
(Horwitz 2002. 148.).
Due to the interdisciplinary characteristic of happiness studies, one could argue that socio-
logists would only add to the quantity of researchers in the fi eld, and not make a distinctive 
contribution, however the argument is unconvincing, as there are many other interdisciplinary 
topics that sociologists study alongside other researchers and social scientists (Bartram 2011). 
Sociological accounts of happiness and of happiness studies not only fi ll gaps in the academic 
literature, but also have their place in contemporary societies, in public discourse, at policy level, 
and in political debates. Sociologists might be especially well suited to look into the ways in 
which people’s perceptions of and actions on happiness vary, and analyse the observed variance 
with conventional sociological methods and tools – look at inequalities, power relations and 
other core sociological variables and concepts (Illouz 1997; Ahmed 2010). Furthermore, since 
‘individual characteristics alone are unlikely to provide a satisfactory account of the variation 
in happiness across individuals’ (Firebaugh and Schroeder 2009:808), sociologists are particu-
larly well equipped to contribute to happiness studies given their traditional emphasis on social 
context (Frawley 2015). 
What sociology already does
Th e fi rst two sections of this article looked at why sociology ignored, and how sociology 
can help the study of happiness. Th is section looks at how sociology already contributes to 
happiness research. 
Th e economic and psychological approaches to happiness studies have largely informed the 
sociological research on happiness of the last two decades. Frawley (2015) puts together a list of 
scholars in the fi eld, classifi ed according to their research interests. For research on correlates and 
contributors to happiness, Frawley identifi es the work of Burt and Atkinson (2011) on hobbies 
that lead to ‘fl ow’ – a concept fi rst introduced by psychology professor Mihaly Csikszentmiha-
lyi (1990); Hsieh (2011) on happiness, income, and the life cycle; Schnittker (2008) on genetic 
endowments; and Firebaugh and Shroeder (2009) on money and social comparison. Others 
explored happiness levels in certain populations, mostly by conducting quantitative research, for 
example Radcliff (2005) on union members, and Freedman et al. (2012) on older people with 
disabilities. And some scholars have looked at happiness and wellbeing in the context of health 
promotion, a topic of increasing importance – among others Cameron et al. 2006; Cropper 
et al. 2007; Carlisle–Hanlon 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Hanlon–Carlisle 2009; Carlisle et al. 
2009; and Kobau et al. 2011. 
Apart from the work produced by the above-mentioned scholars, sociological research on 
happiness and wellbeing continues to be published in journals like Social Indicators Research 
and the Journal of Happiness Studies, which are ‘niche’ publications (Frawley 2015), but also 
in special issues in more general or mainstream publications, such as the recent Sociological 
Research Online edited special issue on happiness studies (May 2014). 
Extensive work has been done on determinants and correlates of happiness. One of the 
most researched areas includes correlations between income and happiness, an area infl uenced 
by studies in behavioural economics, which will be discussed in more depth in the remainder 
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of this paper. Other factors that infl uence happiness levels to a larger extent than income does 
include health, employment (specifi cally, the avoidance of unemployment), marriage or stable 
intimate partnership, religiosity and sociability (Bartram 2011); cross-sectional studies would 
oft en give diff erent results than longitudinal studies. Married people or those living together 
with a partner in a stable relationship are happier than single people, however as people are 
diff erent, for some marriage can lead to a long-lasting increase in happiness (Lucas et al. 2003), 
while for others happiness can decline aft er the initial stages of the relationship and sometimes 
return to the pre-relationship happiness level (Helliwell 2003). Unemployment is one of the 
strongest predictors that correlate inversely with happiness levels (Clark–Oswald 1994; Lucas 
et al. 2004). And religiosity can also infl uence happiness, however being moderated by a social 
context (Bartram 2011), and it is mostly conducive to happiness for those people who have a 
strong religious identity (Lim–Putnam 2010).
In terms of key demographics, there are few that make ‘unambiguous independent contri-
butions to happiness models’ (Bartram 2011.8.). Bivariate analyses show that women are on 
average happier than men, but the diff erence in happiness tends to be insignifi cant in other more 
complex analyses, depending on the control variables (Dolan et al. 2008). Age also correlates 
with happiness levels, and a large number of studies show a U-shaped relationship, meaning 
happiness declines in early adulthood, and then increases aft er middle age. In recent years, 
several scholars (Safi 2010; Bartram 2011) have expressed an interest in the eff ect that migra-
tion has on happiness levels and found that immigrants tend to be less happy than natives; this 
phenomenon is diffi  cult to explain due to it not being a straightforward causal relationship, so 
it can be either because migrants have unrealistic expectations about life in their new country, 
or because these people already experience lower happiness levels before migrating. 
Apart from the key demographics, correlates and determinants reviewed in the above two 
paragraphs, researchers have investigated the eff ect of culture on happiness and wellbeing levels 
(Suh – Oishi 2004; Oishi et al. 1999; Uchida et al. 2004; Lu – Gilmour 2004). Most studies in 
this area imply broad distinctions along the individualist-collectivist axis (European/American 
versus East Asian). In individualist societies, happiness is dependent on variables like personal 
achievement and self-esteem, while in collectivist societies, happiness is defi ned in terms of the 
wellbeing of the group (of the family or of a close social circle) and of interpersonal connectedness. 
Th e existing research includes many other aspects than those covered in this article and the 
literature is continually expanding in social sciences in general, but also in sociology in recent 
years. To look at some of fi ndings in more depth, the next section looks at contributions from 
scholars in the discipline of behavioural economics, particularly at the Easterlin paradox and 
at the concept of utility in the context of happiness and wellbeing research. 
Happiness economics
Contributions of the discipline
One of the most notable areas of interest to emerge from the happiness movement (both 
within academia and outside) has included correlations with wealth, measurements of econo-
mical progress and its potential detrimental consequences at societal level. Th ese concerns have 
been taken into consideration by a sub-discipline in economics, namely behavioural economics 
(not equated, but sometimes referred to as happiness economics or the economics of happiness).
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In economics, the ‘rediscovery’ of the concept of happiness can be traced back to a 1971 essay 
by Brickman and Campbell, titled Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society (Bruni – 
Porta 2007). In their essay, Brickman and Campbell coined the term ‘hedonic treadmill’ (also 
known as hedonic adaptation) which describes the human tendency to go back to an initial and 
fairly stable level of happiness despite the impact of major positive or negative episodes in their 
lives. Th e ‘hedonic treadmill theory’ (developed later by British psychologist Michael Eysenck) 
accounts for one of the most common concerns in the fi eld, namely that ‘money does not bring 
happiness’, and is based on the observation that as one’s earnings increase, so do their expecta-
tions and wishes, and so there can be no lasting increase in happiness. Referring to Brickman 
and Campbell’s essay, Bruni and Porta considered it to be ‘the starting point of the new studies 
on happiness in relation to the economic domain’ (Bruni – Porta 2007. xiv.). 
A signifi cant part of the social scientifi c corpus of literature on the measurement and cor-
relates of happiness has been established in the discipline of behavioral economics. Some of the 
prominent academics in this discipline are economists Richard Easterlin (1974, 2001, 2010), 
known for the Easterlin paradox, Richard Layard (2005), whose work focused on the infl uence 
of better mental health on social and economic life, and the signifi cance of non-income variables 
on aggregate happiness, Andrew Oswald (1994) who has looked at economic and social deter-
minants of happiness and mental health, and Bruno Frey (2002) whose main interest was in the 
application of economic tools to happiness and wellbeing. Likewise, other social scientists also 
brought contributions to happiness economics, among them psychologists Martin Seligman 
(2002, 2011) and Daniel Kahneman (1999, 2006), who in fact won the 2002 Nobel Memorial 
Prize in Economic Sciences, and sociologist Ruut Veenhoven (1991, 2004, 2006). Th e cross-
disciplinary contributions to the economics of happiness can be justifi ed given that it ‘combines 
the techniques typically used by economists with those more commonly used by psychologists. 
It relies on surveys of the reported well-being of hundreds of thousands of individuals across 
countries and continents.’ (Graham 2005. 41.).
Contemporary research into social indicators for the monitoring of societal progress has 
drawn attention to the importance of happiness and wellbeing measures at a national level to 
complement the more traditional economic measures like GDP (Hyman 2011). Following the 
example of Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness, the UK has too developed its own Measuring 
National Wellbeing programme. Concurrently, a signifi cant number of organisations are now 
promoting or researching happiness and wellbeing in the UK (the fi rst country in the Western 
hemisphere to implement a complementary index to GDP – Th e Wellbeing Index – for measuring 
societal ‘progress’). Comparable to Martin Seligman’s activity in the USA, in the UK, Richard 
Layard has further popularised the idea that measures of what makes a good society should 
include, apart from those on economic growth, conceptions of wellbeing (Cieslik 2013). In 
consequence, Layard’s work has infl uenced the activity of several organisations5 in the UK, and 
has encouraged them to develop ways of measuring wellbeing and of talking about happiness 
to others. 
Concerns about GDP measurements of ‘progress’ (Layard 2005, Easterlin 1974, Oswald 
1997) shape one of the focal points of interest in the economics of happiness, with economists 
identifying a phenomenon that describes no correlation, and sometimes inverse correlation 
between increasing material wealth and happiness. Th is phenomenon, which was described as 
a paradox by Richard Easterlin in 1974, is now known as the ‘Easterlin Paradox’ and is based 
 5 Organisations such as Action for Happiness and the New Economics Foundation (nef).
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on the observation that income increases at national levels do not correspond to increases in 
happiness levels. Th e Easterlin paradox, described as ‘a touchstone of the literature’ (Bartram 
2011. 6.) is part of the rationale behind the increasing interest in and the ‘need’ for happiness 
studies, and has also brought in debates about interventions at policy level. Richard Layard, for 
example, opens the fi rst chapter in his book Happiness: Lessons from a New Science with 
Th ere is a paradox at the heart of our lives. Most people want more income and strive for it. Yet 
as Western societies have got richer, their people have become no happier. (Layard 2005. 3.)
He then attests to the accuracy of his statement, writing, 
Th is is no old wives’ tale. It is a fact proven by many pieces of scientifi c research. As I’ll show, 
we have good ways to measure how happy people are, and all the evidence says that on average 
people are no happier today than people were fi ft y years ago. Yet at the same time average 
incomes have more than doubled. (Layard 2005. 3.)
Th ere are two statements worth taking into consideration here. Th e fi rst one is the expla-
nation of the paradox, by bringing awareness on the apparent discrepancy between people’s 
increasingly more comfortable lives and their set levels of happiness that seemed to not have 
changed despite these reasons. Used this way, the Easterlin paradox is becoming instrumental 
in discussions at policy level about introducing alternative measures for societal progress. And 
the second statement is notoriously prevalent today mostly in the media, but also in academic 
writing in positive psychology and economics, and consists of calling attention upon research 
that is scientifi c, brings evidence and showcases facts that are proven about a particular matter, 
in this case about the paradox. In the quote above, Layard uses all these key words (that I have 
italicised in the previous sentence), as they give credence to his arguments right from the very 
beginning of his book, which was written for a general readership. 
If we were to isolate the Easterlin paradox to the discipline of economics, its infl uence in 
politics and policy would perhaps be justifi ed, but the question of the ambivalence of progress 
is one of the most prominent themes in discussions of modernity (Bulmahn 2000). It is not just 
social scientists who have asked whether the individual can lead a happier life in modern society, 
but also artists, composers, poets and writers. Long before Easterlin, Émile Durkheim proposed, 
But, in fact, is it true that the happiness of the individual increases as man advances? Nothing 
is more doubtful. (Durkheim 1960. 241.)
Durkheim, however, questioned this ambivalence by pointing to an essential diff erence 
between production, which can theoretically grow indefi nitely and happiness, which is subjec-
ted to an upper limit. One other reason behind his logic is that considering how social change 
generally extends over multiple generations, some people who play a part in these social changes 
do not live long enough to benefi t from those changes, if that were the case (Frawley 2012). 
Th us, Durkheim argues against utilitarian approaches to human progress and, referring to the 
transition from mechanical to organic solidarity and to other social changes, like the division 
of labour, he writes that if these changes happened solely with the purpose to increase human 
happiness, then happiness 
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would have arrived at its extreme limit long ago, just as would have the civilization that has 
arisen from it, and both would have come to a halt, 
moreover, 
[a] moderate development would have been suffi  cient to assure individuals the sum-total of 
pleasures of which they were capable. Humanity would have rapidly come to a state from 
which it would not have emerged. Th at is what happened to animals; most have not changed 
for centuries, because they have arrived at this state of equilibrium. (Durkheim 1960. 241.)
An initial interest among social science academics to better understand human happiness 
and collect data on levels and determinants of happiness has rapidly spread outside academia, 
in politics, leading several national governments to want to have access to such measures and 
use them in the monitoring of societal progress. In the UK, in November 2010, Prime Minister 
David Cameron announced the implementation of subjective wellbeing indicators as comple-
mentary measures to GDP (Gross Domestic Product). Six months later, such measures were 
included in the ONS (Offi  ce for National Statistics) Integrated Household Survey, with the 
general expectations to measure, in utilitarian terms, ‘what matters most’, as Jil Matheson, the 
national statistician at the time, said 
[w]e must measure what matters – the key elements of national well-being. We want to develop 
measures based on what people tell us matters most. (Matheson 2010)
For the following section, I chose to look at the work of Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, in 
particular, as their 2002 book Happiness & Economics is the fi rst to empirically connect happiness 
and economics, and also happiness and democracy. Th ey discuss the extent to which utility and 
happiness are related and use fi ndings from positive psychology, measurements of quality of life, 
sociological insights as well as data from political science. 
Utility, happiness and subjective wellbeing
One of the central topics in the economics of happiness is that of utility, which is oft en 
associated with the idea that happiness is the ultimate goal of human life; this idea has been put 
forward by philosophers, but also by economists, starting with Aristotle who saw happiness as 
‘the meaning and the purpose of life, the whole aim and end of human existence’, and William 
James who said ‘How to gain, how to keep, how to recover happiness is in fact for most men 
at all times the secret motive for all they do’ (1902:76) and ending with contemporary econo-
mists, like Richard Layard, who propose the utilitarian principle of happiness as the end goal. 
For many, happiness is the only value that is fi nal and suffi  cient, and everything else is just a 
means to an end. While there is a large degree of consensus among happiness economics on 
this matter, that happiness is the ultimate goal of human life, others disagree and see happiness 
as merely one of the components of ‘the good life’, and distinguish other goals as being as or 
more important. Some of these are virtue, justice, freedom, companionship, trust and absence 
of pain (Frey–Stutzer 2002). 
Th e 1930s saw a total change in the concept of utility, along with the development of a new 
branch of economics, new welfare economics. Th is new discipline favoured ordinal utility instead 
of cardinal utility to explain individual choices, so utility was to be refl ected in shown beha-
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viour. A few decades later, economics witnessed another ‘dramatic change’, as Frey and Stutzer 
describe it, that marked the beginning of a movement based on the idea that ‘utility should be 
given content in terms of happiness, and that it can, and should be measured’ (Frey – Stutzer 
2002. 20.). Th e authors identify four major developments that have been conducive to this change. 
Th e fi rst one is based on the evidence that individual preferences and individual happiness diff er, 
mainly because observed behavior cannot be explained by self-concerned preferences alone (as 
it was previously theorised). 
Th e second development is based on the fact that economists have moved away from the 
dependency on nonsubstantive utility, and one of the main arguments, proposed by enterprising 
economist Tibor Scitovsky in his book Th e Joyless Economy (1976), was that most pleasures 
in life are not for sale, do not have a price and cannot be bought. Today the message that life’s 
pleasures are not for sale, paradoxically, sells in the happiness industry – especially when it comes 
to self-help or personal development. 
Th e third development identifi ed by Frey and Stutzer is linked to the advances in research 
on the concept and measurement of happiness made in psychology over the last six decades. 
Th e two authors argue that although there is virtually no connection between psychology and 
(theoretical) economics, the high level of rigour and empirical support that psychologists have 
shown in the study of happiness have made ‘the new idea of measurable utility palatable to at 
least some economists.’ (Frey – Stutzer 2002. 21.). 
Finally, the fourth development comes from a bold claim in psychology, that people are 
generally not capable to choose the greatest amount of utility for themselves. One ‘exaggerated’ 
affi  rmation, as Frey and Stutzer consider it, that contributes to the claim comes from Nisbett – 
Ross (1980. 223.) who wrote that ‘people do not know what makes them happy and what makes 
them unhappy’. To see what accounts for the discrepancy between substantive utility (meaning 
subjective wellbeing or happiness) and preference, Frey and Stutzer identify three types of reasons. 
Firstly there are contextual infl uences, i.e. when people compare themselves to others. Secondly, 
there are biases in cognition, which lead to asymmetries and thus people are prone to making 
distorted decisions. Th e authors distinguish four such biases: prospect theory, which explains a 
phenomenon where losses are more profoundly valued than gains of similar proportions; neglec-
ting the actual duration, a phenomenon identifi ed by Kahneman – Varey (1991) which explains 
that people rather focus on the intensity of pain, but not on how long they had endured it; the 
endowment eff ect (Thaler 1980) which explains that people prefer a certain object for the sole 
reason that it is in their possession, over another object (the same or similar) that they do now 
own; and overoptimism, a bias that explains how people in trust that the outcomes of certain 
events are better for them than for other people (e.g. when people underestimate the probability 
of being involved in an accident or contracting a serious disease). Finally, the third reason why 
people are generally not capable to choose the greatest amount of utility for themselves is their 
limited ability to predict their own future and future tastes. Most people, for example, would 
rather die in an accident than lose both legs or both arms, however studies done on quadriplegics 
do no report signifi cantly lower levels of happiness than those of healthy people. 
Apart from the transition to new welfare economics and its focus on ordinal utility, the 
discipline of economics has invested an interest into reported subjective wellbeing and measure-
ment methods and techniques. Th e ways in which subjective wellbeing can be captured were not 
developed within economics, but rather in psychology; there are four ways generally accepted: 
fi rst, through physiological and neurobiological indicators (specifi cally, brain waves), though so 
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far these indicators have not been widely used in practice; second, in observed social behaviour, 
however this method is not entirely reliable, as similar types of behaviour, like friendliness, eleva-
ted activity levels, outgoing personality can be also observed in people with lower happiness levels; 
third, in nonverbal behaviour, mainly in the relationship between frequent smiling, enthusiastic 
body movements and happiness, but like the previous two, observing nonverbal behaviour can 
also be unreliable because, Frey and Stutzer hold, these types of nonverbal behaviour can also 
be observed in unhappy people, so it would be diffi  cult to determine a person’s wellbeing based 
on these behaviours alone (suicide, for example, cannot be predicted); and fourth, capturing 
subjective wellbeing through surveys. By contrast with the earlier claim that people do not 
know what makes them happy or unhappy (Nisbett – Ross 1980), self-reported happiness is 
currently one of the best and widely utilised indicators of happiness. Research in economics and 
sociology has pointed out to the fact that people are able to routinely evaluate their own state 
of wellbeing. However, self-reported happiness measured through surveys disregards certain 
variables such as culture and cultural contingencies (Jugureanu – Hughes 2010), and oft en 
dismiss a qualitative approach to data gathering. 
Th e fi rst standard question used as a measure of subjective wellbeing was applied by the 
University of Michigan’s SRC – Survey Research Center – and the NORC – National Opinion 
Research Center, and was formulated as: 
Taken all together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very 
happy, pretty happy, or not too happy? (Frey – Stutzer 2002. 26.)
Similar to the initial standard question, but using a four point item instead of three, the 
World Value Survey asks: 
Taken all together, how happy would you say you are: very happy, quite happy, not very 
happy, not happy at all? 
Th e European Social Survey (ESS), the Eurobarometer Survey and the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) use similar questions, but require rating happiness levels on a Likert scale. 
Th e ESS asks: 
Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are, 0 being extremely unhappy and 
10 being extremely happy? (Please ring as appropriate)
Extremely Extremely
unhappy happy
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
In contrast to the World Value Survey, the Eurobarometer uses diff erent terminology, and 
instead of asking about happiness, it asks about like satisfaction: 
On the whole are you very satisfi ed, fairly satisfi ed, not very satisfi ed, or not at all satisfi ed 
with the life you lead?
StudiesBELVEDEREM E R I D I O N A L E. . 67
One of the most prominent measurements of subjective wellbeing uses multiple-item 
approaches and was developed by Diener and his colleagues. Th e ‘Satisfaction with Life’ scale 
uses fi ve questions on a 1-7 scale raging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’:
 ‘In most ways my life is close to ideal.’
‘Th e conditions of my life are excellent.’
‘I am satisfi ed with my life.’
‘So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.’
‘If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.’
Th ese types of single summary measures (present in the World Value Survey, the Eurobaro-
meter, Th e ESS, the BHPS, and the Satisfaction with Life scale) successfully measure happiness 
levels (Kahneman 1999). Psychologists and economists rely on such measures because they 
provide considerable intrapersonal stability and interpersonal comparability, which allows the 
measures to be applied without signifi cant problems (Frey and Stutzer 2002). Such measures, 
though, do not give insight into determinants of happiness, an area where psychology has made 
signifi cant advances over the last two decades. Frey–Stutzer (2002. 10.) distinguish fi ve cate-
gories of determinants of happiness: 1) personality factors, like self-esteem, optimism, extra-
version and neuroticism; 2) socio-demographic factors (gender, education, marital status etc.); 
3) economic factors, such as unemployment and income; 4) contextual and situational factors, 
such as living conditions, health and interpersonal relations; and 5) institutional factors that 
comprise political participation rights, and the extent of political decentralisation. 
Th ese determinants however are characteristic of individualistic societies – the US, the UK, 
Western Europe, Australia. To a large extent, the existing literature does not take into account 
cultural factors when it comes to measuring happiness levels across nations, which raises issues 
of reliability and internal validity of the quantitative techniques and methods utilised. Further-
more, it is especially problematic when diff erent large-scale surveys yield signifi cantly diff erent 
results across nations – Costa Rica is the world’s happiest country according to the ‘Happy Planet 
Index’, while Denmark is the world’s happiest country according to the ‘World Happiness Report’.
Concluding comments
Th is article has reviewed some of the social scientifi c literature on happiness. It explored 
sociological contributions to happiness research and the extent to which the discipline of eco-
nomics has played a part in the development of happiness studies. 
Much of the initial academic literature on happiness focused on correlates of happiness and 
social indicators and adopted an inter-disciplinary approach to research. In predominantly quan-
titative studies, happiness and wellbeing have been correlated with personality traits (DeNeve 
– Cooper 1998), with economic indicators at societal level (Easterlin 1974; Frey – Stutzer 
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2002), with major life changes like winning the lottery or becoming paralysed (Brickman et al. 
1978), with unemployment (Clark – Oswald 1994), with culture (Oishi – Diener 2003; Lu 
2001) and with constituents of ‘the good life’ and ways of maintaining or boosting one’s levels of 
happiness (Seligman 2011; Lyubomirsky et al. 2005; Csikszentmihalyi 2002). Apart from cor-
relates, research on social indicators (which gained popularity in the 1960s) followed a tendency 
to move beyond just economic indicators in the study of quality of life (Andrews 1989), and that 
indirectly lead to happiness and wellbeing becoming ‘politically fashionable’ (Marks 2011. 22.). 
Furthermore, there is very little intra- and inter-disciplinary consensus on concepts and 
terminology in the study of happiness, and no universally accepted defi nitions. In economics 
and psychology, happiness is used interchangeably with wellbeing and subjective wellbeing, and 
in the study of social indicators, the terms quality of life and life satisfaction are preferred. In 
media and populist literature, happiness remains the concept people like to use, arguably for its 
weight and impact, especially in Western societies (US, UK, Western Europe, Australia), but 
it is also the terminology of choice for some academics (like LSE Professors Paul Dolan and 
Richard Layard).
Finally, happiness remains an under-researched area in sociology, while other disciplines 
like economics and psychology have off ered theoretical support towards their versions of hap-
piness studies. Sociological theory could largely inform already existing accounts of happiness 
and wellbeing, and could therefore enrich the rather empirically-oriented fi eld of happiness and 
wellbeing studies. ❋
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